CASE LAWS
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The below information is not to
be misinterpreted as any legal advice and is not presented by an
attorney. This site is just designed to help as a guide and an
individual should seek legal representation for further interpretation
and applicability. Also realize some of the case laws may have
been appealed or new case law precedent.
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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE A PARENT CASE
LAWS
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Bell
v. City of Milwaukee (7th Cir. 1984)
- The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that severance in
the parent-child relationship caused by the state occur only with
rigorous protections for individual liberty interests at stake.
The parent-child relationship is a liberty interest protected by the
Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. 746 f 2d 1205, 1242-45;
US Ct. App 7th Cir WI (1985)
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Carson
v. Elrod
- No bond is
more precious and none should be more zealously protected by the law as
the bond between parent and child. 411 F Supp 645, 649; DC E.D.
VA (1976)
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Doe
v. Irwin (US. D. C. of Michigan 1985)
- The rights of
parents to the care, custody and nurture of their children is of such
character that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions, and such right is a fundamental right
protected by this amendment (First) and Amendments 5, 9, and 14.
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Doe et al, v. Heck et al
(7th Cir. Ct. App. 2003)
- The practice of "no prior consent" interview of a child,
will ordinarily constitute a "clear violation" of the constitutional
rights of parents under the 4th and 14th Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution. The investigative interview of a child constitutes
a "search and seizure" and, when conducted on private property without
"consent, a warrant, probable cause, or exigent circumstances (imminent
danger)," such an interview is an unreasonable search and seizure in
violation of the rights of the parent, child, and, possibly of the
private property.
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Elrod
v. Burns (96 S. Ct. 1976)
- Loss of First
Amendment Freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably
constitutes irreparable injury. Though First Amendment rights are
not absolute, they may be curtailed only by interests of vital
importance, the burden of proving which rests on their government.
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Franz
v. U.S.
- A parent's
right to the preservation of his relationship with his child derives
from the fact that the parent's achievement of a rich and rewarding
life is likely to depend significantly on his ability to participate in
the rearing of his children. A child's corresponding right to
protection from interference in the relationship derives from the
psychic importance to him of being raised by a loving, responsible,
reliable adult. 707 F 2d 582, 595-599; US Ct App (1983)
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Griswold
v. Connecticut
- The
Constitution also protects "the individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters" Federal Courts (and State Courts),
under Griswold can protect, under the "life, liberty and pursuit of
happiness" phrase of the Declaration of Independence, the right of a
man to enjoy the mutual care, company, love and affection of his
children, and this cannot be taken away from him without due process of
law. There is a family right to privacy, which the state cannot
invade or it becomes actionable for civil rights damages. 381 US
479, (1965)
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Gross
v. State of Illinois
- State Judges,
as well as federal, have the responsibility to respect and protect
persons from violations of federal constitutional rights. 312 F
2d 257; (1963)
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In
the Interest of Cooper (Kansas 1980)
- Parent's
interest in custody of their children is a liberty interest which has
received considerable constitutional protection; a parent who is
deprived of custody of his or her child, even though temporarily,
suffers thereby grievous loss and such loss deserves extensive due
process protection.
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In
re J.S. and C.
- A parent's
right to care and companionship of his or her children are so
fundamental, as to be guaranteed protection under the First, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. 324 A 2d
90; supra 129 NJ Super, at 489.
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Kelson
v. Springfield (US Ct. App 9th Cir. 1985)
- The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit (California) held that the
parent-child relationship is a constitutionally protected liberty
interest. (See: Declaration of Independence--life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness and the 14th Amendment of the United States
Constitution -- No state can deprive any person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law nor deny any person the equal
protection of the laws.) 767 F 2d 651; US Ct. App 9th Cir, 1985
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Langton
v. Maloney (527 F Supp 538, D.C. Conn. 1981)
- The liberty
interest of the family encompasses an interest in retaining custody of
one's children and, thus, a state may not interfere with a parent's
custodial rights absent due process protections.
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Matter
of Delaney (617 P 2d 886, Oklahoma 1980) verify citation
- Parents have
a fundamental constitutionally protected interest in continuity of
legal bond with their children.
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Matter
of Gentry
- A parent's
right to the custody of his or her children is an element of "liberty"
guaranteed by the 5th Amendment and the 14th Amendment of the United
States Constitution. 369 NW 2d 889, MI App Div (1983)
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May
v. Anderson (73 S. Ct. 840 1952)
- The United
States Supreme Court noted that a parent's right to "the companionship,
care, custody and management of his or her children" is an interest
"far more precious" than any property right. 345
US 528, 533; 73
S. Ct. 840, 843 (1952)
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Meyer
v. Nebraska (43 S. Ct. 625 1923) check cite
- Parent's
rights have been recognized as being "essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free man." 262
US 390; 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923)
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Nicholson v. Williams
- Suit challenged the practice of New York's City's
Administration for Children's Services of removing the children of
battered mothers solely because the children saw their mothers being
beaten by husbands or boyfriends. Judge ruled the practice
unconstitutional in a landmark class action suit in U.S. District
Court, Eastern District of New York. Case No. 00-cv-2229.
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Parham v. J.R. (1979)
- Involves parent's rights to make medical decisions
regarding their children's mental health.
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Quilloin
v. Walcott (98 S. Ct. 549 1978)
- The U.S.
Supreme Court implied that "a (once) married father who is separated or
divorced from a mother and is no longer living with his child" could
not constitutionally be treated differently from a currently married
father living with his child. 98 S. Ct. 549; 434
US 246, 255-56,
(1978)
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Reynold
v. Baby Fold, Inc. - verify citation
- Parent's
right to custody of child is a right encompassed within protection of
this amendment which may not be interfered with under guise of
protecting public interest by legislative action which is arbitrary or
without reasonable relation to some purpose within competency of state
to effect.
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Santosky
v. Kramer (102 S. Ct. 1388 1982)
- Even when
blood relationships are strained, parents retain vital interest in
preventing irretrievable destruction of their family life; if anything,
persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have
more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting
state intervention into ongoing family affairs. The U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that clear and convincing evidence rather than a mere
preponderance were needed to terminate parental rights. 455
US 745 (1982)
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Stanley
v. Illinois (92 S. Ct. 1208 1972)
- The Court
stressed, "the parent-child relationship is an important interest that
undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing
interest, protection." A parent's interest in the companionship,
care, custody and management of his or her children rises to a
constitutionally secured right, given the centrality of family life as
the focus for personal meaning and responsibility. 405
US 645,
651; 92 S Ct 1208 (1972)
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DUE PROCESS CASE LAWS
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Bendiburg v. Dempsey (11th Cir.
1990)
- Post-deprivation remedies do not provide due process if
pre-deprivation remedies are practicable.
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Brokaw
v. Mercer County (7th
Cir. 2000)
- Children have a Constitutional right to live with their
parents without government interference. Child's four month
separation from his parents could be
challenged under substantive due process. Sham procedures don't
constitute true procedural due process. -- Just the highlights
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Chrissy v. Miss. Department of
Public Welfare (5th Cir. 1991)
- Plaintiff's clearly established right to meaningful access
to the courts would be violated by suppression of evidence and failure
to report evidence.
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Croft
v. Westmoreland Cty. Children and Youth Services (3rd Cir. 1997)
- Social worker who received
a telephone accusation of abuse and threatened to remove child from the
home unless the father himself left and who did not have ground to
believe the child was in imminent danger of being abused engaged in an
arbitrary abuse of governmental power in ordering the father to leave.
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K.H. through Murphy v. Morgan
(7th Cir. 1990)
- When the state deprives parents and children of their right
to familial integrity, even in an emergency situation, the burden is on
the State to initiate prompt judicial proceedings for a
post-deprivation hearing, and it is irrelevant that a parent could have
hired counsel to force a hearing.
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Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services (1981)
- State intervention to terminate the relationship between a
parent and a child must be accomplished by procedures meeting the
requisites of the Due Process Clause. 452 US 18, 37.
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Malik
v. Arapahoe Cty.
Department of Social Services (10th Cir. 1999)
- Absent extraordinary circumstances, a parent has a liberty
interest in familial association and privacy that cannot be violated
without adequate pre-deprivation procedures. An ex-parte hearing
based on misrepresentation and omission does not constitute notice and
an opportunity to be heard.
- Procurement of an order to seize a child through
distortion, misrepresentation and/or omission is a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
- Parents may assert their children's Fourth Amendment claim
on behalf of their children as well as asserting their own Fourteenth
Amendment claim.
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Morris
v. Dearborne (5th Cir.
1999)
- Right to Procedural Due Process Violated: The state
denied the
plaintiff the fundamental right to a fair procedure before having their
child removed by the intentional use of fraudulent evidence during the
procedure.
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Nicini
v. Morra (3rd Cir. 2000)
- When the state places a child in state-regulated foster
care, the state has duties and the failure to perform such duties may
create liability under 1983.
Liability may attach when the state has taken custody of a child,
regardless of whether the child came to stay with a family on his own
which was not an officially approved foster family.
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Norfleet v. Arkansas Dept. of
Human Services (8th Cir. 1993)
- When the state places a child in a foster home it has an
obligation to provide adequate medical care, protection, and
supervision
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Quilloin v. Walcott (1978)
- A due-process violation occurs when a state-required
breakup of a natural family is founded solely on a "best interests"
analysis that is not supported by the requisite proof of parental
unfitness. 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978)
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Ram
v. Rubin (9th Cir. 1997)
- Children may not be removed from their home by police
officers or social workers without notice and a hearing unless the
officials have a reasonable belief that the children are in imminent
danger.
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Whisman
v. Rinehart (8th Cir.
1997)
- Mother had a clearly established right to an adequate,
prompt post-deprivation hearing. A 17 day period prior to the
hearing was not a prompt hearing.
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Yvonne L. v. New Mexico
Department of Human Services (10th Cir. 1992)
- Children placed in a private foster home have substantive
due process right to personal security and bodily integrity.
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GENERAL FAMILY RIGHTS CASE LAWS
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Blackburn
v. Alabama 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960)
- Coercion can
be mental as well as physical.
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Brokaw
v. Mercer County (7th Cir. 2000)
- Children have standing to sue for their removal after they
reach the age of majority. Children have a constitutional right
to live with their parents without government interference. --
Just the highlights
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Cassady
v. Tackett
- Coercive or
intimidating behavior supports a reasonable belief that compliance is
compelled.
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Florida
v. Bostick (S. Ct. 1991)
- "Consent"
that is the product of official intimidation or harassment is not
consent at all. Citizens do not forfeit their constitutional
rights when they are coerced to comply with a request that they would
prefer to refuse.
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J.B.
v. Washington County (10th Cir. 1997)
- The forced separation of parent from child, even for a
short time (in this case 18 hours), represents a serious infringement
upon the rights of both.
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K.H.
through Murphy v. Morgan (7th Cir. 1990)
- State employee who withhold a child from their family may
infringe on the family's liberty of familial association. Social
workers could not deliberately remove children from their parents and
place them with foster caregivers when the officials reasonably should
have known such an action would cause harm to the child's mental or
physical health.
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Malik
v. Arapahoe Cty. Department of Social Services (10th Cir. 1999)
- Absent extraordinary circumstances, a parent has a liberty
interest in familial association and privacy that cannot be violated
without adequate pre-deprivation procedures.
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North Hudson DYFS v. Koehler
Family (2001)
- The court explained "absent some tangible evidence of abuse
or neglect, the Courts do not authorize fishing expeditions into
citizens' houses. Mere parroting of the phrase "best interest of
the child" without supporting facts and a legal basis is insufficient
to support a Court order based on reasonableness or any other ground."
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Thomason
v. Scan Volunteer Services, Inc. (8th Cir. 1996)
- Parent interest is of "the highest order," and the court
recognizes "the vital importance of curbing overzealous suspicion and
intervention on the part of health care professionals and government
officials."
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Troxel
v. Granville (2002)
- The state may not interfere in child rearing decisions when
a fit parent is available. - Just the
highlights. 530 U.S. 57
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Valmonte
v. Bane (2nd Cir. 1993) Decided March 03, 1994
- A Central Register that identifies individuals accused of
child abuse and neglect and the communication of those names to
potential employers in the child care field, implicates a protectible
liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.
- Appellant alleged the inclusion of her name on the New York
State Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment violated her
right of due process. On appeal, court ruled that the appellant's
right of due process was violated because it was found that she did
have a liberty interest which was imperiled by the procedures.
- The court noted that the procedures, which permitted
inclusion on the Register by virtue of "some credible evidence" of
abuse, created a high risk of error.
- In a similiar case Paul v. Davis, the court ruled that
damage to one's reputation is not "by itself sufficient to invoke the
procedural protection of the Due Process Clause. Rather, the
Court held, loss of reputation must be coupled with some other tangible
element in order to rise to the level of a protectible liberty
interest. This has been interpreted to mean that "stigma plus" is
required to establish a constitutional deprivation.
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Ward
v. San Jose (9th Cir. 1992)
- A child has a constitutionally protected interest in the
companionship and society of his or her parent.
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Weller
v. Department of Social Services for Baltimore (4th Cir. 1990)
- The private, fundamental liberty interest involved in
retaining custody of one's child and the integrity of one's family is
of the greatest importance.
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Whisman
v. Rinehart (8th Cir. 1997)
- Parents and child had a clearly established liberty
interest in associating together. This right was violated where
the defendants allegedly had no indication of any physical neglect of
the child, no indication of any immediate threat to his welfare, and no
indication of any criminal activity by his mother, where they had only
third-hand hearsay that the child's mother had gotten drunk and failed
to pick up the child from his babysitter, and where defendants refused
to return the child, had not investigated to determine whether it was
necessary to remove the child in the first place, and had not
investigated the possibility of returning the child to his mother,
grandmother, or anyone designated by the mother.
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JUDGES
& PROSECUTORS - ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY CASE LAWS
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Ashelman
v. Pope
- As long as
the judge's ultimate acts are judicial actions taken within the court's
subject matter jurisdiction, immunity applies. -- Just the
highlights
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Buckley
v. Fitzsimmons (S. Ct. 1993)
- Prosecutor's allegedly false statements made during a press
conference announcing the indictment of plaintiff had no functional tie
to the judicial process and were not entitled to absolute immunity.
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Chrissy
v. Miss Department of Public Welfare (5th Cir. 1991)
- Prosecutor
was not entitled to absolute immunity for failure to initiate an
investigation, failing to disclose medical reports at a court hearing
and allowing father to have contact with child in violation of a court
order.
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Forrester
v. White (S. Ct. 1988)
- Holding that
judges do not have absolute immunity when acting in an administrative
capacity. -- Just the highlights
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Joseph
v. Patterson (6th Cir. 1986)
- Prosecutor
was not entitled to absolute immunity where it is alleged that he
supervised and participated in an unconstitutional police interrogation.
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Kalina
v. Fletcher (S. Ct. 1997)
- A prosecutor
is not entitled to absolute immunity for allegedly false statements of
fact made in an affidavit supporting an application for a warrant.
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Power
v. Coe (2nd Cir. 1984)
- Prosecutor is
not entitled to absolute immunity for statements he distributes to the
press.
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Zarcone
v. Perry
- Denying
judicial immunity to a judge who ordered a coffee vendor brought before
him in handcuffs because of the poor quality of the coffee.
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QUALIFIED IMMUNITY CASE LAWS
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Ernst
v. Child and Youth Department of Chester County (3rd Cir.
1997)
- Court emphasizes that only qualified immunity is available
for "investigating or administrative" actions such as opening and
investigating child abuse cases.
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Germany
v. Vance (1st Cir. 1989)
- Case worker who intentionally or recklessly withheld
potentially exculpatory information from an adjudicated delinquent or
from the court itself was not entitled to qualified immunity.
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Good
v. Daupin County Social Services (3rd Cir. 1989)
- Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity for
conducting a warrantless search of home during a child abuse
investigation where exigent circumstances were not present. Court
held that a search warrant or exigent circumstances, such as a need to
protect a child against imminent danger of serious bodily injury, was
necessary for an entry without consent, and an anonymous tip was
insufficient to establish special exigency. 891 F.2d 1087
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Grossman
v. City of Portland (9th Cir. 1994)
- Individuals aren't immune for the results of their official
conduct simply because they were enforcing policies or orders.
Where a statute authorizes official conduct which is patently violative
of fundamental constitutional principles, an officer who enforces that
statute is not entitled to qualified immunity.
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Hafer
v. Melo (S. Ct. 1991)
- Social workers (and other government employees) may be sued
for deprivation of civil rights under 42 USC 1983 if they are named in
their 'official and individual capacity. -- Just the highlights
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Harlow
v. Fitzgerald (1982)
- If the law was clearly established at the time the action
occurred, a police officer is not entitled to assert the defense of
qualified immunity based on good faith since a reasonably competent
public official should know the law governing his or her conduct.
457 U.S. 800, 818
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Hurlman
v. Rice (2nd Cir. 1991)
- Defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity or summary
judgment because he should have investigated further prior to ordering
seizure of children based on information he had overheard.
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K.H.
through Murphy v. Morgan (7th Cir. 1990)
- Social workers were not entitled to absolute immunity where
no court order commanded them to place plaintiff with particular foster
caregivers.
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Malik
v. Arapahoe Cty. Department of Social Services (10th Cir. 1999)
- Police officer was not entitled to absolute immunity for
her role in procurement of court order placing child in state custody
where there was evidence officer spoke with the social worker prior to
social worker's conversation with the magistrate and there was evidence
that described the collaborative worker of the two defendants in
creating a "plan of action" to deal with the situation. Officer's
acts were investigative and involved more than merely carrying out a
judicial order.
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Malley
v. Briggs (S. Ct. 1986)
- Police officer is not entitled to absolute immunity, only
qualified immunity, to claim that he caused plaintiff to be unlawfully
arrested by presenting judge with an affidavit that failed to establish
probable cause.
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McCord
v. Maggio (5th Cir. 1991)
- Immunity is defeated if
the official took the complained-of action with malicious intention to
cause a deprivation of rights, or the official violated clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.
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Millspaugh
v. County Department of Public Welfare (7th Cir. 1991)
- Social worker was entitled to absolute immunity for her
testimony in an ex-parte judicial proceeding, but her application for
the ex-parte order is only entitled to qualified immunity.
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Shay
v. Rossi (2000)
- Connecticut
Supreme Court decision on qualified immunity and the individual
liability of the state child welfare workers. The court held,
inter alia, that the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity did not
bar claims against officers and employees of the Department of Children
and Families in their official capacities and that statutory immunity
under Connecticut Gen. Stat 4-165 did not prohibit claims against
defendents in their individual capacities.
- Background:
The state supreme court will decide the threshold issue of whether the
denial of a motion to dismiss on grounds of sovereign immunity is an
appealable final judgment. The trial court denied defendent's
motion to dismiss tort claims against the defendents in their official
capacity. The trial court rules that the allegation that the
defendents exceeded their statutory authority in issuing a 96-hour hold
takes the case out of the realm of sovereign immunity. On appeal,
the plaintiff's argue that their failure to allege reckless, wanton or
malicious conduct does not implicate the court's jurisdiction, but
rather affects only the legal sufficiency of the case. On cross
appeal, the defendents argue that - due to the lack of any
allegation that the defendents either did not have the statutory
authority to issue a 96-hour hold or issued the hold to further an
illegal plan-the court erred in denying the motion to dismiss claims
against them in their official capacity.
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Snell
v. Tunnell (10th Cir. 1990)
- Social workers were not entitled to absolute immunity for
pleadings filed to obtain pick-up order for temporary custody prior to
formal petition being filed. Social workers were not entitled to
absolute immunity where department policy was for social workers to
report findings of neglect or abuse to other authorities for further
investigation or initiation of court proceedings.
- Social workers investigating claims of child abuse are
entitled only to qualified immunity.
- Assisting in the use of information known to be false in
order to further an investigation is not subject to absolute immunity.
- Social workers are not entitled to qualified immunity on
claims they deceived judicial officers in obtaining a custody order or
deliberately or recklessly incorporated known falsehoods into their
reports, criminal complaints and applications.
- Use of information known to be false is not reasonable, and
acts of deliberate falsity or reckless disregard of the truth are not
entitled to qualified immunity.
- No qualified immunity is available for incorporating
allegations into the report or application where official had no
reasonable basis to assume the allegations were true at the time the
document was prepared.
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Wallis
v. Spencer and Wallis
v. City of Escondido (9th Cir. 2000)
- State law cannot provide immunity from suit for federal
civil rights violations. State law providing immunity from suit
for child abuse investigators has no application to suits under
1983.
-- Just the highlights. 202 F.3d 1126
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Walsh v. Erie County Department
of Job and Family Services
- Child protection social workers claimed they were immune
from liability in a civil violation (4th Amendment) suit, claiming
qualified immunity because "they had not had training in Fourth
Amendment law." They felt they couldn't be sued for their
mistake, because they thought they were not binded by the Fourth
Amendment. The court disagreed ruling "That subjective basis for
their ignorance about and actions in violation of the Fourth Amendment
does not relieve them of the consequences of that ignorance and those
actions." and denied their immunity. 3:01-cv-7588.
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Whisman
v. Rinehart (8th Cir. 1997)
- Defendants were not entitled to prosecutorial immunity
where complaint was based on failure to investigate, detaining minor
child, and an inordinate delay in filing court proceedings, because
such actions did not aid in the presentation of a case to the juvenile
court.
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Young
v. Biggers (5th Cir. 1991)
- A defendant in a civil rights case is not entitled to any
immunity if he or she gave false information either in support of an
application for a search warrant or in presenting evidence to a
prosecutor on which the prosecutor based his or her charge against the
plaintiff.
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SEARCH & SEIZURE CASE LAWS
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Aponte
Matos v. Toledo Davilla (1st Cir. 1998)
- An officer who
obtains a warrant through material false statements which result in an
unconstitutional seizure may be held liable personally for his actions
under section 1983.
- False
statements made to obtain a warrant, when the false statements were
necessary to the finding of probable cause on which the warrant was
based, violates the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The
warrant clause contemplates the warrant applicant to be truthful: "no
warrant shall issue, but on probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation." Deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the
truth violates the warrant clause. When a warrant application is
materially false or made in reckless disregard for the truth, the
warrant becomes invalid and will have been obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment's warrant clause. A search must not exceed the
scope of the search authorized in a warrant. By limiting the
authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which
there is probable cause to search, the Fourth Amendment particularity
requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its
justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging
exploratory searches the Framers of the Constitution intended to
prohibit. There is a requirement that the police identify
themselves to the subject of a search, absent exigent
circumstances. Failure to knock and announce forms part of the
reasonableness or not inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.
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Brokaw
v. Mercer County (7th Cir. 2000)
- Child
removals
are "seizures" under the Fourth Amendment. Seizure is
unconstitutional without court order or exigent circumstances.
Court order obtained based on knowingly false information violates
fourth amendment. -- Just the highlights.
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Calabretta
v. Floyd (9th Cir. 1999) Warrant-less Search
- There is no
exception to the warrant requirement for social workers in the context
of a child abuse investigation. A social worker may not force
their way into a home without a search warrant in absence of an
emergency. Police
officers and social workers are not immune for coercing or forcing
entry into a person's home to investigate suspected child abuse,
interrogation of a child, and strip search of a child, without a search
warrant or special exigency.. -- Just the
highlights. 189 F. 3d 808.
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California
v. Hobari D. (1991)
- For purposes
of the Fourth Amendment, a "seizure" of a person is a situation in
which a reasonable person would feel that he is not free to leave, and
also either actually yields to a show of authority from police or
social workers or is physically touched by police. Persons may
not be "seized" without a court order or being placed under
arrest. 499 U.S. 621
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Good
v. Dauphin County Social Services (3rd Cir. 1989)
- Police
officer
and social worker may not conduct a warrant-less search or seizure in a
suspected abuse case, absent exigent circumstances.
- Defendants
must have reason to believe that life or limb is in immediate jeopardy
and that the intrusion is reasonably necessary to alleviate the threat.
- Searches and
seizures in investigation of a child neglect or child abuse case at a
home are governed by the same principles as other searches and seizures
at a home. 891 F.2d 1087
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Griffin v. Wisconsin (483
U.S. 868 - 1987)
- The United States Supreme Court has held that courts may
not use a different standard other than probable cause for the issuance
of such orders. If a court issues a warrant based on an
uncorroborated anonymous tip, the warrant will not survive a judicial
challenge in the higher courts. Anonymous tips are never probable
cause.
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H.R. v. State Department of
Human Resources (Ala. Ct. App. 1992)
- Court held that an anonymous tip standing alone never
amounts to probable cause. 612 So. 2d 477
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Hurlman
v. Rice (2nd Cir. 1991)
- Defendant
should've investigated further prior to ordering seizure of children
based on information he had overheard. The mere possibility of
danger does not constitute an emergency or exigent circumstances that
would justify a forced warrantless entry and a warrantless seizure of a
child.
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Lenz
v. Winburn (11th Cir. 1995)
- The Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures extends
beyond criminal investigations and includes conduct by social workers
in the context of a child neglect/abuse investigation.
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Lion
Boulos v. Wilson
- One's
awareness of his or her right to refuse consent to warrantless entry is
relevant to the issue of voluntariness of alleged content.
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Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte
- Consent to
warrantless entry must be voluntary and not the result of duress or
coercion. Lack of intelligence, not understanding the right not
to consent, or trickery invalidate voluntary consent.
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State v. Hatter (1983)
- The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant clause
only applies when 'an immediate major crisis in the performance of duty
afforded neither time nor opportunity to apply to a
magistrate.' 342 N.W.2d 851, 855 (Iowa 1983)
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Tenenbaum v. Williams (2nd Cir.
1999) and F.K. v. Iowa
- 'In context of a seizure of a child by the State during an
abuse investigation...a court order is the equivalent of a
warrant.' 193 F.3d 581, 602 (2nd Cir. 1999) and F.K. v. Iowa
district Court for Polk County, Id.
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United
States v. Becker (9th Cir. 1991)
- The
protection
offered by the Fourth Amendment and by our laws does not exhaust itself
once a warrant is obtained. The concern for the privacy, the
safety, and the property of our citizens continues and is reflected in
knock and announce requirements. 929 F.2d
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Wallis
v. Spencer (9th Cir. 1999/2000)
- Police
officers or social workers may not "pick up" a child without an
investigation or court order, absent an emergency. Parental
consent is required to take children for medical exams, or an
overriding order from the court after parents have been heard. --
Just the highlights 202 F3d 1126
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Walsh v. Erie County Department
of Job and Family Services
- Child protection workers are subject to the 4th and 14th
Amendment in the context of an investigation of alleged abuse or
neglect as are all "government officials". The court ruled
"despite the defendant's (child protection worker) exaggerated view of
their powers, the Fourth Amendment applies to them, as it does to all
other officers and agents of the state whose request to enter, however
benign or well-intentioned, are met by a closed door." "The
Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures
applies whenever an investigator, be it a police officer, a DCFS
employee, or any other agent of the state, responds to an alleged
instance of child abuse, neglect, or dependency". 3:01-cv-7588.
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White v. Pierce County
(9th Cir. 1986)
- A government official cannot coerce entry into another's
house without a search warrant or applicability of an established
exception to the requirement of a search warrant. Any
governmental official can be held to know that their office does not
give them an unrestricted right to enter peoples' homes at will.
Police could not enter a dwelling without a warrant even under
statutory authority where probable cause existed without exigent
circumstances. 797 F. 2d 812.
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Wooley
v. City of Baton Rouge (5th Cir. 2000)
- Defendants
could not lawfully seize child without a warrant or the existence of
probable cause to believe child was in imminent danger of harm.
- Where police
were not informed of any abuse of the child prior to arriving at
caretaker's home and found no evidence of abuse while there, seizure of
the child was not objectively reasonable and violated the clearly
established Fourth Amendment rights of the child.
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Yabarra
v. Illinois (1979)
- Where the
standard for a seizure or search is probable cause, then there must be
particularized information with respect to a specific person.
This requirement cannot be undercut or avoided simply by pointing to
the fact that coincidentally there exists probable cause to arrest or
to search or to seizure another person or to search a place where the
person may happen to be. 44 U.S. 85
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Under Title IV-E "reasonable efforts", DCF is required by Federal law to pr ovide the disabled mother with any services she needs in order to keep the child home.
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